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Climate Change 
and Extreme Events: 
What Role for Insurance?
Key Points
  Natural disasters cause more deaths in low-income countries than in 
middle-income and high-income countries combined. Disasters also impose a 
greater economic burden, relatively speaking, on vulnerable developing countries. 
Lack of resources means such countries struggle to recover from disasters, 
exacerbating poverty.
  Climate change is expected to increase weather variability and extreme weather 
events particularly affecting developing countries. The UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change recognizes the unfair burden and obliges developed countries 
to assist vulnerable countries.
  Although not a panacea for adapting to climate change, insurance instruments 
offer substantial benefits for low-income countries, both to reduce their vulnerability 
to weather variability and adapt to climate change. The Bali Action Plan calls upon 
policymakers to consider insurance as part of an adaptation strategy.
  Insurance enables vulnerable countries to exercise their “rights” to reliable, 
dignified post-disaster relief without sacrificing self-respect; it can contribute to 
reducing poverty by providing the pre-disaster security necessary for taking risky, 
high-return, investments.
  Novel risk-sharing arrangements, such as index-based insurance, 
can also encourage countries to invest in preventive measures, since claims 
depend on a physical trigger and not on actual losses.
  Due to the large capital-reserve requirements, the costs of insuring against 
natural disasters can be high if countries pursue the strategy alone. Coordination 
with other countries and engaging donor support can help make insurance affordable. 
This is also a promising strategy for development organizations: it provides them 
a secure planning horizon, leverages tight humanitarian budgets, and creates 
incentives for reducing losses and ultimately the need for post-disaster aid.
  A global mechanism for supporting pro-poor insurance as part of a 
post-Copenhagen adaptation strategy could provide affordable security 
at a lower cost by pooling national insurance programs.
Experts expect 
climate change to affect 
not just average temperature, 
but also weather variability 
and extreme weather 
events. The effects, including 
economic and human losses, 
impose a disproportionate 
burden on vulnerable 
developing countries. 
How can insurance, including 
public–private arrangements 
with international support, 
play a role in helping 
vulnerable countries adapt? 
This Policy Brief offers 
practical guidance to 
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How are developing countries affected 
by weather variability and extremes?
Over 95 per cent of deaths from natural disasters in the last 
25 years occurred in developing countries. Direct economic losses 
(averaging US$ 100 billion per annum in the last decade) were more 
than twice as high in low-national-income countries as opposed 
to high-income ones (Figure 1). According to the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), more than 
three-quarters of recent economic losses can be attributed to 
windstorms, floods, droughts, and other climate-related hazards, 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has predicted that climate change will magnify these losses 
because of increasing weather variability.
Moreover, indirect losses that arise from the long-term 
consequences of disasters on economic development can greatly 
amplify the direct economic and human losses. Many highly exposed 
developing countries cannot fully recover by simply relying on 
limited external donor aid. In turn, external investors are wary 
of the risk of catastrophic infrastructure losses, while small firms 
and farmers cannot access the credit necessary for investing in 
higher-yield/higher-risk activities. This leads to slowed economic 
recovery, exacerbating poverty.
When is it advisable for low-income 
households, businesses, and governments 
to insure against climate-related risks?
Insurance cannot be a panacea for governments, households, 
and businesses in those highly exposed and vulnerable countries 
trying to adapt to climate change. It is generally inappropriate 
for very slow-onset climate impacts, such as sea-level rise and 
desertification, where other instruments are needed.
Most importantly, insurance must be considered within an overall 
risk-management and adaptation strategy. The two top priorities 
are avoiding dangerous climate change and preventing human and 
economic losses.
Whether insurance is advisable depends on its benefits and costs. 
By spreading losses temporally and geographically, and assuring 
timely liquidity for the recovery and reconstruction process, 
insurance is beneficial to those in the risk pool. And by enabling 
productive adaptation, insurance brings the added benefit of 
helping communities escape from disaster-induced poverty traps.
Yet the costs are high. Because the events can affect whole 
regions at the same time (covariant risks), insurers charge extra 
for holding large capital reserves. This adds significantly to 
the insurance premium. Without government or donor support, 
private insurance is thus not easily affordable to low-income 
clients. The market, alone, cannot cover the insurance 
needs of the poor.
What is the experience with 
insurance instruments and programs 
in developing countries?
Catastrophe insurance is playing an increasingly visible role in 
developing countries with novel, donor-supported programs 
demonstrating their potential to pool economic losses and 
smooth incomes of the poor facing weather variability and climate 
extremes, as well as transfer risks to the global capital markets. 
For example:
  In Malawi, smallholder farmers can buy affordable, 
index-based drought insurance. Unlike traditional claims-based 
insurance, indemnity is based on an index of local rainfall. 
By making farmers more creditworthy, this pilot loan/insurance 
scheme enables farmers to purchase hybrid seeds, and thus 
greatly increase their productivity.
  To insure against insufficient funds for post-disaster relief 
and infrastructure repair the Mexican government has insured its 
catastrophe reserve fun, including a catastrophe bond, which pays 
an above-market interest rate if rainfall exceeds a specified level, 
but part of the principal would go to the Mexican government if 
rainfall is below this level.
  The Caribbean island states have recently formed the world’s 
first multi-country and index-based catastrophe insurance pool to 
provide governments with immediate liquidity in the aftermath of 
hurricanes or earthquakes.
Participants at an expert workshop on Insurance Instruments 
for Adaptation to Climate Risks, hosted by IIASA in 2007, 
Figure 1 
A disproportionate 
share of the human 
and economic burdens 
from natural disasters 
(1980–2004) falls on 
low-income and lower 
middle-income countries. 
(Source: IIASA 




































































noted that experience was too short to judge if internationally 
backed public–private systems were viable in the long term. 
However, they might radically change the way development 
organizations provide disaster aid and support adaptation 
to climate change. Importantly, without exception the 
schemes have received technical and/or financial support 
from international development and donor organizations. 
Can climate insurance be designed 
in a way that contributes to adaptation 
instead of maladaptation?
Adaptation can be thought of as reducing risks to lives and 
livelihoods, property and assets. This includes physical interventions 
(flood defences or early warning systems); lifestyle changes 
(relocating or changing livelihoods); training for early warning 
systems; and strategies for recovery (formal and informal insurance). 
Insurance can be part of a wider adaptation toolkit if it is designed 
to reduce risk and help vulnerable countries and people adapt to 
climate change. But insurance without this design element will be 
less effective.
Well-designed insurance reduces disaster losses in two ways: 
(1) by providing early liquidity, it prevents long-term loss of 
livelihood and lives; and (2) by pricing risk, it sets strong incentives 
for pre-disaster preventive behavior. In Istanbul, for example, 
apartment owners who choose to disaster-proof their properties 
pay a lower insurance premium, making investments in safety more 
attractive. Poorly-designed insurance contracts, on the other hand, 
can discourage investments in loss prevention or even encourage 
negligent behavior.
What principles should guide outside 
support for insurance programs?
There is discussion on how both the public and the private sector 
could most effectively implement insurance programs that avoid 
moral hazard and disincentives for reducing risks associated with 
badly designed insurance instruments. There are some basic 
principles that could guide support for insurance programs, 
these include:
Firstly; greatest priority should be on the most vulnerable people 
and countries. There must be transparent, participatory, and 
inclusive decision-making at all levels.
Adaptation is the goal, disaster risk reduction and insurance are 
complimentary components, and therefore, insurance should 
help manage uncertainty, provide financial smoothing, and at the 
same time reduce risk. A recent micro-insurance system in Ethiopia 
provides opportunities for farmers to work on risk-reducing projects 
in the off season as a way of paying their premiums, thus avoiding 
the price distortions of direct subsidies.
Support to government risk transfer should also avoid creating 
disincentives for adaptation and crowding out the private 
market, for example by targeting extreme event risks, which 
private markets are reluctant to cover, and coupling support 
with requirements for risk reduction.
Finally, support must be predictable, reliable and result in 
regular and adequate flows of finance. Installments should be 
periodic and be above and beyond existing official development 
assistance targets.
What role might insurance instruments play 
in a climate-adaptation regime?
To help define this role, IIASA has worked with the Munich Climate 
Insurance Initiative (MCII) to put forward a proposal for a risk management 
module consisting of two pillars, risk reduction and insurance, which 
would act together to reduce the human and economic burdens on 
developing countries (Figure 2). Both pillars would be fully financed 
by a post-Copenhagen, multilateral adaptation fund.
The disaster risk reduction pillar
Preventing and reducing human and economic losses from climate-related 
disasters must be the first priority of a risk-management strategy. 
The first pillar thus calls for comprehensive risk management across 
vulnerable countries, building on detailed risk assessments. Risk 
assessments can uncover unforeseen possibilities for risk reduction, like 
early warning and land-use restrictions, and help lay the groundwork 
for risk-transfer systems. Qualification for participation in the insurance 
pillar might include progress on a credible risk-management strategy, 
with a specific focus on the most vulnerable communities and sectors.
Figure 2 
The MCII proposed 
risk-management module, 
together with other 
adaptation activities, 
would help vulnerable 
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This has two tiers, reflecting the different layers of risk 
that need to be addressed for effective climate adaptation: 
“high level,” exceeding the ability of any given country to pay 
in the case of an extreme event; and “middle level,” where any 
given country could cope given the proper facilitating framework. 
“Low level” risk is absent; this can often be dealt with more 
cost-effectively by prevention measures.
As shown in Figure 3, the first tier would provide insurance 
cover to vulnerable country governments for a pre-defined 
high layer of risk (e.g., events expected to occur only 
every 100 to 500 years), and the premiums would be fully 
paid from a post-Kyoto adaptation fund. The second tier 
would enable mainly micro-scale risk-pooling and transfer 
mechanisms that provide cover for medium-loss events 
(e.g., events expected to occur every 10 to 100 years).
Insurance pillar, Tier 1 takes the form of a solidarity fund, or 
Climate Insurance Pool (CIP), to indemnify developing country 
property and infrastructure (and, potentially, lives and livelihoods) 
against low-frequency, high-consequence, climate-related 
events. The CIP would receive a fixed annual allocation from an 
adaptation fund equaling the expected average annual costs of 
the insurance scheme. The CIP operations would be managed by a 
dedicated professional insurance team responsible for risk pricing, 
loss evaluation (potentially based on an index), and indemnity 
payments, as well as placing reinsurance.
Insurance pillar, Tier 2 would take the form of a Climate Insurance 
Assistance Facility (CIAF) to provide support for the middle layer of 
risk and is based on a proposal by Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 
(2006), similar to a recent proposal for a joint International Fund 
for Agricultural Development—World Food Programme Weather 
Risk Management Facility, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. It would offer support to nascent micro-, meso-, and 
macro-scale disaster insurance systems, like those operating in 
Malawi and the Caribbean.
The MCII proposal emphasizes the complementary role of risk 
management, reduction, and sharing. The proposal addresses 
the challenge of providing support to promote sustainable, 
affordable, and incentive-compatible insurance programs with 
minimal crowding out of private sector involvement. While 
the first tier offers premium-free insurance for an upper layer 
of risk, it can be justified by market failure for this risk layer. 
By enabling insurance for the poor, this tier opens opportunities 
for capitalization through risk-transfer programs involving the 
private market. The second tier imposes affordable prices on 
heretofore unpriced risks—thus replacing the negative incentives 
and moral hazard created by post-disaster aid—and creates 
ample opportunities for the private sector in insuring and 
reinsuring these programs.
“Communities value disaster insurance not because it rewards them 
or makes them richer after a disaster. They value insurance because they 
see it as an instrument of dignity. Financial support to recover from a disaster 
becomes their right without sacrificing their self respect. It is far more dignified 
to claim your right for recovery than to find yourself dependent on the 
ad hoc generosity of donors.”
 — Hari Krishna (2007), Expert Workshop on Insurance Instruments  
for Adaptation to Climate Risks, Laxenburg, Austria
Tier 1
Climate insurance
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middle-layer risks













A two-tiered insurance pillar 
as part of an adaptation fund.
What is the message to policymakers 
for a post-2012 strategy?
One clear message for policymakers is that insurance mechanisms 
have a promising role in an adaptation regime. There are large, 
potential benefits for insurance in the developing world:
  providing security against the wholesale loss of assets, 
livelihoods, and even lives in the post-disaster period;
  changing the way development organizations provide 
disaster assistance and, at the same time, engaging the 
private sector in vast markets;
  ensuring reliable and dignified post-disaster relief;
  setting powerful incentives for prevention; and not least,
  spurring economic development.
There are also many challenges: assuring sustainability and 
affordability in light of covariant risks; defining an appropriate role 
for donors, given the inefficiencies of subsidies; and assuring that 
systems avoid moral hazard and contribute to “good” investments.
A second message is that options already exist for including 
insurance mechanisms in the post-2012 adaptation strategy. 
As a practical way forward, this discussion has laid out a 
two-pillar international risk-management approach as part of 
an adaptation regime supported by the international community: 
a risk reduction pillar that would directly support risk-reduction 
measures and a two-tiered insurance pillar that would address 
high- and medium-layers of risk.
Because of the substantial economies of scale related to pooling 
public- and private-sector risks, there are strong arguments for 
creating facilities for sharing risk at the global or regional scales.
By clarifying the opportunities and challenges of insurance as 
an instrument for adaptation, and outlining a practical way 
forward, it is hoped that this discussion contributes to the 
opportunities facing policymakers in adopting a comprehensive 
post-2012 adaptation strategy that enables risk-management and 
insurance through the funding of a global adaptation strategy.
Children fetch water during flooding in Sudan, August 2008. 
UN Photo/Tim McKulka 
Drought has severely impacted many farmers and crop yields 
in the west of Nepal in 2008. © Naresh Newar/IRIN
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